In the early hours of Thursday, the Prime Minister’s Office published a press release as follows: “The political-military cabinet approved the Prime Minister’s proposal for the decisive defeat of Hamas.
The IDF will prepare to establish control over Gaza City while simultaneously ensuring humanitarian aid to the civilian population outside the areas of combat.
The Cabinet, by a majority vote, adopted five principles for ending the war:
1. The disarmament of Hamas.
2. The return of all abductees (hostages) — both living and deceased.
3. The demilitarization of the Gaza Strip.
4. Israeli security control in the Gaza Strip.
5. The presence of an alternative civil administration that is neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.
The overwhelming majority of cabinet ministers held that the alternative plan presented to the cabinet would lead neither to the crushing defeat of Hamas nor to the return of the abductees.”
The most dramatic thing, in my view, about this decision is that, with G-d’s help, it was taken despite resistance from part of the ministers, the top brass and specifically the Chief of the General Staff. He proposed limiting the army’s actions to a blockade of the militants’ concentrations and trying to wear them down in that way.
To some, such a plan might seem reasonable, except that we, schooled by the bitter experience of previous General Staff decisions and Hamas’s behavior, understand well that this would more likely be a way to quietly put the brakes on any active operations. Some would even call it a kind of work-to-rule by the generals. In the end, Israel would come under ever-increasing international pressure and would eventually be forced to yield to Hamas’s demands, agree to withdraw and preserve the terrorists’ rule in the Strip, ending the war in defeat — to the delight of Netanyahu’s opponents and his right-wing government.
Along with the Chief of the General Staff, this proposal was pushed by Foreign Minister Sa’ar, Minister Elkin and Deri, who, incidentally, is not even a minister. It is reported that this was a very stormy discussion, including sharp exchanges between the Chief of the General Staff and the ministers who supported the full conquest of the Strip, probably Smotrich and Ben-Gvir.
Finally, after almost ten hours of discussion — note, one of the longest cabinet meetings in the country’s history — with G-d’s help a dramatic decision was taken. For now, the focus is on suppressing the enemy in Gaza City, but the trajectory is clear — the IDF has been ordered to conquer the Strip.
At the same time, the opponents of decisive action nevertheless managed to secure the inclusion of several points that are, from my point of view, unfavorable (it is known that Ben-Gvir and Smotrich voted against some of them). Below I set out my thoughts on this.
Main problems
As I have already noted, what is envisaged is a gradual conquest, step by step — at first only Gaza City, and only afterwards will the IDF reach the area of the “Central Camps,” which so far has not been touched at all and where, by all appearances, there is a large concentration of militants, high-ranking commanders and Hamas weapons factories.
The problem here is that such a sequential conquest leaves Hamas with plenty of space and “breathing time.” If it had been decided to attack both Gaza City and the Central Camps simultaneously, the pressure on Hamas would have been much stronger and, in my estimation, it would have collapsed.
But when only Gaza City is attacked, this gives the terrorists enough time, for example, to transfer the abductees from Gaza City toward the Central Camps, as well as to prepare better for the subsequent battles for the Central Camps.
In addition, this gives Hamas much time to use media outlets and protest groups that in practice collaborate with Hamas to exert pressure on public opinion in Israel and worldwide, in order to try to halt the offensive before it reaches the Central Camps, which for Hamas are the main thing, since that is now its principal stronghold.
In other words: Hamas retains the opportunity to deceive Israel by declaring that it is “interested in a deal,” and thereby stop the offensive before it reaches the places most important to it and leads to its rout.
It was decided that Gaza City, together with the entire Strip, will receive very large volumes of aid — several times more than are flowing there today. And this is, of course, a huge mistake, which is clear to all of us.
A few more thoughts regarding the government’s decision:
Although military pressure after the cabinet decision has already begun (Gaza is already under heavy bombardment), by estimates, preparation for the direct operation to establish control over Gaza City will take several weeks.
The decision on the full conquest of the Strip was taken after Hamas effectively wrecked even an interim deal to release half of the abductees — because it demanded in exchange a complete cessation of the war, the IDF’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor and from the entire perimeter, together with the release of thousands of militants.
In addition, according to intelligence, Hamas is currently not interested in (or not capable of) concluding any comprehensive agreement on the release of all abductees. This information, the intelligence services assert, came from reliable sources.
According to this information, Hamas fears that if they free all the abductees, Israel will take them, temporarily leave the Strip, but then return, conquer it and completely eliminate Hamas. Moreover, part of the Hamas leadership that is in direct contact with Iran and subordinate to it is not interested in any agreement, since such an agreement is not beneficial to the Iranian leadership at all, and the Persians do not pity the Arabs. As a result, Hamas is not ready for any deal, and is merely “buying time,” while continuing to starve our hostages and causing them ever greater harm.
It is for this reason that Netanyahu, who assesses the situation much more clearly than many generals and ministers, set a course for the full conquest of the Strip. The Chief of the General Staff is also perfectly aware of these data, but perhaps he really believes that by means of a blockade and attrition Hamas can be forced to capitulate. Or perhaps he is simply not ready to resist pressure from influential opponents of the government who wish for Netanyahu’s failure, even at the price of Israel’s defeat.
The German Chancellor stated: “We will cease supplying weapons to Israel that could be used in the war in Gaza.” This is a problematic statement, because Germany today supplies spare parts and engines for tanks and armored personnel carriers.
The IDF will have to urgently find alternative suppliers, and this task is by no means simple.
The United States, by contrast, declared its support for Israel, providing a “green light” for a large-scale operation in Gaza.